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ABSTRACT
A digital forensic investigation aims to collect and anal-
yse the evidence necessary to demonstrate a potential hy-
pothesis of a digital crime. Despite the availability of sev-
eral digital forensics tools, investigators still approach each
crime case from scratch, postulating potential hypotheses
and analysing large volumes of data. This paper proposes
to explicitly model forensic requirements in order to engineer
software systems that are forensic-ready and guide the activ-
ities of a digital investigation. Forensic requirements relate
some speculative hypotheses of a crime to the evidence that
should be collected and analysed in a crime scene. In con-
trast to existing approaches, we propose to perform proactive
activities to preserve important - potentially ephemeral - ev-
idence, depending on the risk of a crime to take place. Once
an investigation starts, the evidence collected proactively is
analysed to assess if some of the speculative hypotheses of
a crime hold and what further evidence is necessary to sup-
port them. For each hypothesis that is satisfied, a structured
argument is generated to demonstrate how the evidence col-
lected supports that hypothesis. Our evaluation results sug-
gest that the approach provides correct investigative find-
ings and reduces significantly the amount of evidence to be
collected and the hypotheses to be analysed.
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agement of Information Systems]: Security and Protec-
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1. INTRODUCTION
A digital forensic investigation [31] aims to collect and
analyse the evidence necessary to demonstrate a potential
hypothesis of a digital crime, which explains how that crime
was committed, what harm was done, and who was respon-
sible. A number of processes [7, 34, 28] and several digi-
tal forensics tools [38, 4, 20, 6, 1, 25, 10] can be used to
conduct a digital investigation. However, digital investiga-
tions remain highly human-intensive, and investigators usu-
ally approach each crime case from scratch, by postulating
potential hypotheses and manually analysing large volumes
of – often irrelevant – data. Existing tools do not provide
any investigative direction to suggest the potential hypothe-
ses, including the evidence they require to be demonstrated,
their likelihood of being true, or the evidence necessary to
demonstrate them. Some evidence can also be ephemeral,
as it can be concealed by an attacker or it can come from
volatile sources. Indeed this evidence might be lost if it is
not preserved before an investigation starts.
A software engineering challenge in digital forensics is to
build systems that are forensic-ready [36], which maximises
the potential to use digital evidence whilst minimising the
costs of an investigation. Such systems not only should
preserve all necessary evidence, but they should also help
investigators assess the likelihood of potential hypotheses,
and link the evidence collected to the findings of an inves-
tigation. To address this challenge, this paper proposes to
explicitly model forensic requirements that relate some spec-
ulative hypotheses of a crime to the evidence to be collected
in the crime scene. The hypotheses express how a crime can
be committed and are formalised as logic expressions. The
crime scene represents a bounded environment where a crime
can be perpetrated. Forensic requirements also capture pat-
terns of “suspicious events” that indicate that a crime may
be taking place and for which all necessary evidence should
be collected for some time.
Forensic requirements are used to configure a digital foren-
sics process that includes proactive and reactive activities.
Proactive activities – evidence collection and analysis – are
performed during the normal system operation. Proactive
collection preserves important – potentially ephemeral – ev-
idence, which might otherwise be lost, before an investiga-
tion starts. Proactive analysis detects “suspicious events”
and therefore enables the collection of additional evidence
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for some time. Once an investigation starts, some reactive
activities are performed. First, forensics requirements are
used to identify all potential hypotheses of a crime. Hy-
potheses are formalised in the Event Calculus [27] and are
examined using Decreasoner [26], an Event Calculus anal-
yser. The findings of this preliminary analysis are presented
to the investigator, suggesting which hypotheses should be
investigated (because they are likely) or ignored (because
they have been formally refuted). For each hypothesis that
may hold, our process suggests the remaining evidence that
needs to be collected, and reactively re-analyses the crime
in light of the new evidence. When a hypothesis is fully
satisfied, our process automatically generates a structured
argument [43] that demonstrates how the evidence collected
formally supports that hypothesis.
This paper is a first step towards engineering forensic-
ready systems and it builds on the assumption that all po-
tential crimes are known and can be specified in advance.
The paper provides three main contributions. First, it pro-
poses a novel adaptive digital forensics process - initially
sketched in [33] - to systematically perform the activities
to be conducted before and during a digital investigation.
The process performs proactive activities to preserve im-
portant evidence and suggests immediate investigative di-
rections. Second, the paper introduces the notion of foren-
sic requirements to systematically configure the activities of
the proposed digital forensics process depending on a spe-
cific crime scene and on the potential hypotheses of a crime.
Finally, the paper explains how structured arguments can
be used to present the findings of an investigation. We il-
lustrate our approach on a criminal case of confidentiality
infringement and evaluated it on a realistic digital forensic
scenario [16]. Our results suggest that the approach pro-
vides correct investigative findings and reduces significantly
the amount of evidence to be collected and the number of
hypotheses to be analysed compared to traditional digital
investigations.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
presents the background and related research, while Section
III illustrates a working example. Section IV provides an
overview of our proposed digital forensics process. Sections
V, VI and VII use our example to illustrate forensics re-
quirements, and the proactive and reactive activities of our
digital forensics process, respectively. Section VIII discusses
our evaluation results, Section IX reviews related work, and
Section X concludes.
2. PRELIMINARIES
This Section clarifies the differences of our approach with
intrusion detection systems (IDS), illustrates the use of ar-
guments, and introduces the Event Calculus.
2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
Our approach augments traditional digital investigations
with proactive activities, which are similar to the opera-
tions of IDS [5]. These detect and diagnose different kinds
of attacks, such as intrusions, DDoS, and application-level
attacks, by collecting and analysing data (network traffic)
in real time. IDS perform proactive collection and analy-
sis to recognize specific patterns in data that may suggest
that an attack is taking place, discover new attacks, and
re-configure firewall rules to counteract the attacks. How-
ever, IDS are not primarily designed to gather forensically
meaningful evidence necessary to explain a crime. In con-
trast, the objective of this work is to engineer systems that
are forensic-ready and are able to perform proactive evi-
dence collection and analysis respectively to identify suspi-
cious events and preserve additional evidence necessary to
reconstruct a crime after it has been committed.
2.2 Argumentation
To explain the findings of an investigation we use a form
of argument inspired by the work of Toulmin [43]. Toulmin-
style arguments capture relationships between a claim and
domain properties (grounds and facts), the assumptions that
eventually support the grounds (warrants), and the reasons
why the argument might not be valid (rebuttals). Arguments
have been applied successfully to model and analyse privacy
and security requirements. Haley et al. [21], have used Toul-
min arguments to recursively represent the rebuttals and
mitigations when reasoning about the satisfaction of secu-
rity requirements. In their approach, security requirements
are expressed as claims that are supported by grounds and
warrants. Rebuttals show evidence that contradicts other
arguments, whilst mitigations describe how rebuttals may be
avoided or tolerated. Franqueira et al. [13] combine security
arguments with risk assessment exploiting publicly available
security catalogues. Privacy arguments [44] have been used
to analyse selective disclosure requirements allowing reason-
ing about the satisfaction of personal non-disclosure require-
ments when context changes.
Our work uses arguments to link the hypotheses of a crime
(claims) to the evidence to be collected (facts), and the prop-
erties (grounds) and the assumptions (warrants) that hold
in the crime scene. Since all these elements are represented
explicitly in advance as forensic requirements, when a hy-
pothesis is satisfied, it is possible to build an argument sys-
tematically to explain how a crime took place depending on
the evidence collected. The derived argument structure can
help provide robust evidence to support a hypothesis.
2.3 Event Calculus
To facilitate formal reasoning, the hypotheses of a crime
are expressed in the Event Calculus, a language based on
first-order predicate calculus. The Event Calculus is well
suited to describing and reasoning about event-based tem-
poral systems [17]. The calculus relates event sequences to
fluents that denote the states of a system. Fluents are ini-
tiated by an event and cease to hold when terminated by
another event. Event claulcus also includes non-temporal
predicates and functions that return a non-boolean result.
Table 1 gives the meanings of the elementary predicates and
quantifiers of the subset of the calculus we use in this pa-
per. The Event Calculus supports both deductive and abduc-
tive reasoning. Deduction uses the description of the system
behaviour together with the history of events occurring in
the system to derive the events/fluents that occur/hold at
a particular point in time. Abduction determines the se-
quence of events that must have occurred to allow a set of
events/fluents to hold/occur.
The Event Calculus is a suitable formalism for digital in-
vestigations [45]. Events can represent the actions that oc-
cur in a crime scene, which can also be perpetrated by an
offender. Fluents can represent the state of the elements
modelled in the crime scene. Deductive reasoning can be
used for proactive analysis to determine if a suspicious event
Table 1: Event Calculus Predicates and Quantifiers
Predicate Meaning
Happens(a, t) Action a occurs at time t
Initiates(a, f, t) Fluent f starts to hold after action a at time t
Terminates(a, f, t) Fluent f ceases to hold after action a at time t
HoldsAt(f, t) Fluent f holds at time t
t1 < t2 Time point t1 is before time point t2
Quantifier Meaning
{arg1, . . . , argN} Exists: ∃ arg1, . . . , argN
[arg1, . . . , argN ] Forall: ∀ arg1, . . . , argN
happened. Abductive reasoning can be used for reactive
analysis to speculate on what sequence of events might have
occurred, if any, to allow the system to satisfy the condition
claimed in the hypothesis.
3. WORKING EXAMPLE
Although enterprises often invest significant resources to
develop incident response plans, very little effort is devoted
to the identification and preservation of digital evidence and
the structuring of processes for possible prosecution. The
need for enterprises to prepare themselves for a crime inves-
tigation has also been highlighted in ISO27001/2 [42]. This
can be particularly useful for those crimes following a spe-
cific pattern and whose hypotheses can be modelled with
little effort. For example, the FBI Financial Crimes Report
of 2010–2011 [41] identifies the crime patterns in corporate
and health care cases. Corporate fraud crimes often involve
insider trading using confidential information. For example,
in the Galleon Group case [30], insiders were charged for the
unauthorized release of proprietary corporate information.
While for the WikiLeaks case, an insider copied corporate
sensitive information onto a CD.
We assume that the crime scene is within a bounded en-
vironment, where crimes follow a pre-determined pattern.
Inspired by the cases above, our working example is set in
an enterprise building, where two employees (Alice and Bob)
work. A sensitive document (Doc) is stored on a server ma-
chine located in the office T225. Both Alice and Bob are au-
thorized to access T225 and to log on the machine M1. Access
to T225 is controlled by a NFC reader and is monitored by
a CCTV camera. Bob and Alice work on their personal desk-
tops (M2 and M3, respectively), provided by the company.
We also assume that potential offenders are the enterprise
employees who can leak the sensitive document.
4. DIGITAL FORENSIC PROCESS
Figure 1 provides a schematic overview of our digital foren-
sics process, comprising eight steps that we now describe.
1) Requirements Modelling. Forensic requirements
represent the crime scene and the speculative hypotheses of
a crime. A security administrator, who has relevant domain
expertise, model the crime scene, which describes a bounded
environment where a crime can be perpetrated. It includes
a general and a concrete domain model. The general domain
model represents the generic entities (e.g., employees, files,
locations) and evidence sources (e.g., computers, cameras),
including their possible states. Evidence sources are those
elements from which evidence can be collected. The con-
crete domain model instantiates the general model on the
concrete elements available in a crime scene, and identifies
their initial state and the events to be monitored. A con-
crete domain model for our example can include company’s
employees (Alice and Bob), a confidential document (Doc),
computers (M1, M2, and M3) and an office (T225). As an ini-
tial state, one can assume that Doc is stored in M1, which in
turn is located in T225. The crime scene also includes a set
of assumptions about the domain.
In this work a crime is conceived as non-compliance to a
governmental or corporate regulation [22] and the hypothe-
ses of a crime represent how a violation of these regulations
can happen. For example, if a corporate regulation states
that a confidential document should not exfiltrate from the
PC where it is stored, a generic hypothesis can express that
an employee is logged onto the PC where the document is
stored, s/he is in the room where the PC is located, and
copies the document onto a USB storage.
For each generic hypothesis of a crime, a suspicious event
is also represented. This expresses a condition in the crime
scene that might indicate that the corresponding hypothesis
of a crime is likely to be satisfied, and all the necessary
evidence to prove it must be collected in advance until the
suspicious event condition no longer holds. An example of
suspicious event may indicate that a user is logged onto the
machine in which the document is stored and mounts a USB
storage.
2) Configuration. Forensic requirements are used to
configure the proactive and reactive activities of a digital
forensic process. Suspicious events are used to configure
the conditions that will be checked by the Proactive Anal-
ysis to start/stop the full evidence collection (collection of
all possible and necessary evidence to satisfy a hypothesis).
Forensic requirements are also used to generate the poten-
tial hypotheses given as input to the Reactive Analysis. Po-
tential hypotheses are defined by instantiating the generic
hypotheses on the concrete elements of the crime scene. For
our example, a number of hypotheses (33 = 27) will be gen-
erated depending on who can be in T225, who can log on
M1, and who can own the storage device which should be
mounted on M1 (Alice only, Bob only, or both Alice and
Bob).
3) Proactive Collection. If no start condition is sat-
isfied, the Proactive Collection only gathers all the events
necessary to verify whether any of the start conditions holds.
Otherwise, it will additionally gather all possible and neces-
sary events to demonstrate the hypotheses associated with
the start conditions that hold at that time. The Proactive
Collection stores all monitored events securely and sends to
the Proactive Analysis only those events necessary to verify
the start and stop conditions.
4) Proactive Analysis. When new evidence is avail-
able, the Event Calculus Analyzer (Analyzer) checks if the
conditions to start/stop the full evidence collection are sat-
isfied. In case a start condition is satisfied, the Proactive
Analysis signals the Proactive Collection to enable the full
evidence collection for the hypothesis associated with the
satisfied start condition. When a stop condition is satisfied,
the Proactive Analysis signals the Proactive Collection to
gather only the evidence necessary to verify the correspond-
ing start condition.
5) Investigation Set-up. Once an investigation has
started, the Reactive Analysis retrieves the data collected
proactively from the Secure Storage.
6) Reactive Analysis. The Event Caluclus Analyzer
Forensic Requirements
Proactive Analysis
Investigator
Secure
Storage
Presentation
H1
H2
H3
%
%
%
Reactive Analysis 
Proactive Collection
Event Calculus 
Analyzer
Event Calculus 
Analyzer
Potential
Hypotheses
Requirements Modeling
Security 
Administrator
Crime Scene
  
- General Domain Model
- Concrete Domain Model
- Domain Assumptions 
HypothesesHypothesesGeneric
Hypotheses
HypothesesHypothesesSuspicious Events
              Monitor
2
3
5
8
6
2
Proactive
Activities
Reactive
Activities
1
4
Start & Stop 
Conditions
Monitored 
Evidence
7
Regulations
1
Figure 1: Adaptive Digital Forensics Process.
(Analyzer) evaluates the satisfaction of each potential hy-
pothesis and sends the results to the Presentation activity.
In particular, it identifies the hypothesis that can still hold
and cannot be refuted on the base of the data collected. For
example, we can assume that the events retrieved from the
Secure Storage make the Reactive Analysis conclude that
Bob was the only user logged on M1 who copied the Doc on a
USB pen. In this case, only those hypotheses that claim that
Bob was the only employee logged on M1 who copied the Doc
on a USB pen can still hold.
7) Presentation. This activity shows the satisfaction
of each potential hypothesis. The investigator selects the
hypotheses s/he wants to focus on and receives indications
regarding the remaining evidence to be collected. For ex-
ample, the investigator is suggested to collect additional ev-
idence from a camera to confirm that Bob was in T225 when
he logged on M1, and from Bob’s computer to verify whether
Bob owns the USB pen.
8) Reactive Collection. The investigator retrieves ad-
ditional evidence, by using existing commercial tools (e.g.,
Sleuthkit [6]) and stores it securely. The cycle (activities
5-8) continues until the investigator identifies a hypothesis
that is fully satisfied. In this case, the Presentation auto-
matically generates an argument that demonstrates how the
evidence collected formally supports it.
5. FORENSIC REQUIREMENTS
Forensics requirements represent the crime scene, the hy-
potheses of a crime and suspicious events.
5.1 Crime Scene
As described previously, a crime scene consists of a general
and a concrete domain model and a set of domain assump-
tions.
1) A General Domain Model represents the “type” of the
entities and evidence sources in the crime scene. The general
domain model of our example is shown in Figure 2. Entities
can be employees, files, storage devices, and locations, while
evidence sources can be computers, cameras, and card read-
ers. Entities and evidence sources can be associated with
some states, represented as attributes in Figure 2. For ex-
ample, an employee can be In a location and Logged on a
computer. S/he can also Possess a storage device, and be
authorized to log on a computer (HasPermission) or to ac-
cess a location (HasBadge). A file and a storage device can be
respectively Stored and Mounted on a computer. A reader
and a camera can monitor the access to a location (states
AccessControl and Monitor, respectively), and a computer
can be in a location (PlacedIn). The general domain model
also includes general events. An event must have a source
(arrow’s tail) and an observer (arrow’s head). Events can
initiate or terminate one of the states of their source, and
also have additional parameters. For example, Login and
Logout respectively initiate and terminate state Logged of
an employee for the computer on which the login/logout op-
eration was performed.
Key Evidence Source Entity Event
- Stored: computer - AccessControl
reader
- Monitor
camerafile
location
- In: location
- Possess: storage
- HasBadge: location
- HasPermission: computer
- Logged: computer
- PlacedIn
employee
- Mounted: computer
storage
Owns
- Iniitates: Possess
Enter
- Iniitates: In
Exit
- Terminates: In
Login
- Initiates: Logged
Logout
- Terminates: Logged
Mount
- Initiates: Mounted Unmount
- Terminates: Mounted
computer
Copy
Figure 2: The General Domain Model of our exam-
ple.
2) A Concrete Domain Model instantiates the entities and
the evidence sources specified in the general model depend-
ing on the concrete elements that are present in the crime
scene. As shown in Figure 3, the concrete domain model of
our example includes a location (room T225), three comput-
ers (M1, M2, M3), two employees (Alice and Bob), a camera
(CCTV), a NFC reader (NFC reader), and a confidential file
(Doc). The concrete domain model also devises the initial
states for some elements of the crime scene. For example,
Doc is stored on M1, which in turn is located in T225. CCTV
and NFC control accesses to T225. Alice and Bob are autho-
rized to access T225, and have permission to log on M1 and
their own corporate computers (M3 and M2, respectively).
The concrete domain model also represents monitored events
identifying the concrete evidence that can be collected from
a crime scene. The first and the last parameter of a mon-
itored event identify respectively its source and observer –
the evidence source from which an event must be collected.
For example, Sys_Login and Sys_Logout respectively iden-
tify login and logout operations performed by an employee
(source) on a computer (observer).
Swipe_Card and HighMountConts signal respectively that an
employee swiped his/her card on a reader and a storage de-
vice was mounted several times (e.g., more than 3 times)
on a computer. Any other middle parameter of an event
– if present – identifies additional information. For exam-
ple, Sys_Copy signals that a file was copied onto a directory
(file’). The data coming from the sources of evidence rep-
resented with dashed lines cannot be collected proactively,
because they cannot be gathered automatically, such as the
evidence from a CCTV (CCTV_Access and CCTV_Exit), or be-
cause it is illegal to do so without a search warrant, such
as evidence from an employee’s corporate computer (e.g.,
HighMountCounts from M2 or M3).
Sys_Copy 
(file, file', computer)
Sys_Mount 
(storage, file, 
computer)
Sys_Unmount 
(storage, file, 
computer)
HighMountCounts
(storage, computer)
Sys_Login 
(employee, computer)
Sys_Logout 
(employee, computer)
Swipe_Card 
(employee, reader)
CCTV_Access 
(employee, location, 
camera)
CCTV_Exit 
(employee, location, 
camera)
Alice:: employee
HasBadge(T225)
HasPermission(M1)
HasPermission(M3) Bob:: employee
HasBadge(T225)
HasPermission(M1)
HasPermission(M2)
T225:: location
CCTV:: camera
Monitor(T225)
NFC:: reader
AccessControl(T225)
M3:: computer
M1:: computer
PlacedIn(T225)
Key
Concrete Entity
Monitored Event
M2:: computer
Doc:: file
Stored(M1)
E:: file
Stored(M1)
Figure 3: The Concrete Domain Model of our ex-
ample.
3) Domain Assumptions are inference rules that link mon-
itored events to the events and the states represented in
the general domain model. Figure 4 shows some domain
assumptions of our example. They are represented as im-
plications or equivalences among Event Calculus predicates
expressions. The first domain assumption states that an
employee logins on a computer (Login) if and only if s/he
has the necessary permission, a monitored event Sys_Login
signals that s/he performed the login, and no user is already
logged on that computer. Note that the Login event ini-
tiates state Logged of the aforementioned employee. The
second domain assumption states that a storage device is
mounted at a specific mount point (file) in a computer, if
and only if the storage is not already mounted, the mount
point exists on that computer (StoredIn), and an attempt
to mount a storage device was performed (Sys_Mount).
5.2 Hypotheses and Suspicious Events
The generic hypothesis of a crime and the suspicious event
of our example are represented in Figure 4. They are for-
malized as an Event Calculus expression on the events and
the states of the elements in the crime scene. Our hypoth-
esis states that at least an employee is in T225; one of the
employees is logged on M1 and copies the Doc on his/her USB
pen which is mounted on M1. A suspicious event indicates
that an employee is logged on M1 and mounts a USB pen.
Note also that suspicious event conditions can only be ex-
pressed on those events that can be collected automatically
(i.e., proactively). A hypothesis of a crime (H) must always
imply its corresponding suspicious event condition (SE), but
not vice-versa: H → SE ∧ ¬(SE → H).
Since proactive analysis is performed during the normal
system operations, we aim to reduce its complexity by keep-
ing a suspicious event condition simple (i.e., with a smaller
number of predicates compared to those included in its cor-
responding hypothesis). However, on the other hand, the
choice of a suspicious event condition should still allow re-
ducing the amount of evidence collected proactively, and in-
deed it cannot be too simple and must still indicate if there
is the risk of a crime to happen. Note that a suspicious event
condition can only be specified if a hypothesis of a crime is
composed of at least two predicates.
6. PROACTIVE ACTIVITIES
Proactive activities aim to collect evidence necessary to
explain a crime. Full evidence collection is performed only
when a suspicious event condition suggests that a crime
is taking place, and is terminated after such condition no
longer holds.
The Proactive Analysis is initially configured to check the
start conditions necessary to activate the full evidence collec-
tion. In particular, the Event Calculus Analyzer (Analyzer)
receives as input an Event Calculus specification, shown in
Figure 5, which is obtained from the forensic requirements.
The first part of the specification is static and is necessary
to define a set of built-in types (sort), such as boolean,
integer, time, predicate, event, and fluent. The gen-
eral domain model is used to derive the second part of the
specification. In particular, entities and evidence sources are
translated into a set of Event Calculus types (sorts), while
events are translated into Event Calculus events. Source,
additional parameters – if present – and observer of each
event are also encoded as event parameters. For each state
an entity/evidence source can assume, a corresponding flu-
ent is created, having the state’s subject and object as pa-
rameters. An Initiates/Terminates predicate is generated
for each state initiated/terminated by an event. For exam-
ple, Figure 5 shows how events Login and Logout respec-
tively initiate and terminate state Logged.
The concrete domain model is used to generate the third
part of the Event Calculus specification. The initial states
are used to identify the initial predicates, which hold at time
0 for some of the Event Calculus constants. For all the other
possible states that do not hold at time 0, a negated predi-
cate is created. Monitored events are translated into Event
Calculus events. Concrete entities and evidence sources are
translated into Event Calculus constants. The fourth part
of the Event Calculus specification is generated from the ev-
idence gathered during the Proactive Collection. The fifth
and the sixth parts include respectively the domain assump-
tions and the condition characterising a suspicious event.
The last part also indicates the time interval that should
be considered during the analysis (range), which in turn de-
pends on the number of time instants in which the Proactive
{employee,file,time} HoldsAt(Logged(employee,M1),time) & HoldsAt(Mounted(storage,file,M1),time).
Suspicious Event
{storage,employee,file,time,time1}  HoldsAt(In(employee,T225),time)  & HoldsAt(Mounted(storage,file,M1),time) & 
   HoldsAt(Logged(employee,M1),time) & Happens(Copy(Doc,file,M1),time) & HoldsAt(Possess(employee,storage),time1). 
Generic Hypothesis
[employee, computer, location, time]
Happens(Sys_Login(employee,computer),time) & ([employee1] !HoldsAt(Logged(employee1,computer),time)) & 
   HoldsAt(HasPermission(employee,computer),time) <-> Happens(Login(employee,computer),time).
[employee, computer, storage, file, time] 
Happens(Sys_Mount(storage,file,computer),time) & !HoldsAt(Mounted(storage,file,computer),time) & 
   HoldsAt(StoredIn(file,computer),time) <->  Happens(Mounted(storage,file,computer),time).
    ...   
Domain Assumptions
Figure 4: Domain assumptions, generic hypothesis, and suspicious event of our example.
Collection gathers some new event.
The Proactive Collection is initially configured to collect
the monitored events necessary to check the suspicious event
conditions. To this extent, it is necessary to identify the
events and the entities’ states a suspicious event condition
predicates on. The suspicious event condition shown in Fig-
ure 5 is specified over state Logged and event Mount. Then,
for each state, the initiating and terminating events are iden-
tified, from the general domain model. For example, events
Login and Logout are identified from state Logged. Finally
the monitored events to be collected to detect these com-
plex events are identified from the domain assumptions. For
our example, the Proactive Collection is configured to col-
lect events Sys_Login, Sys_Logout, Sys_Mount, and Sys_Un-
mount from M1 to detect respectively complex events Login,
Logout, Mount, and Unmount.
When the Proactive Collection gathers some new events,
these are sent to the Analyzer that updates the Event Cal-
culus specification to be evaluated. In particular, it incre-
ments the time range and adds to the Collected Evidence
(part 4 in Figure 5) a set of predicates representing the
events that took place in the last time instant. For ex-
ample, if event Sys_Login(Bob,M1) happened at instant 5,
the Collected Evidence part is updated with predicate Hap-
pens(Sys_Login(Bob,M1),5). Furthermore, all other pos-
sible ways in which event Sys_Login can take place are
negated (e.g., !Happens(Sys_Login(Alice, M1),5)).
When the start condition is satisfied, the Analyzer sig-
nals the Proactive Collection to enable the full evidence col-
lection. In our example, the Proactive Collection will also
gather all Sys_Copy from M1. In the meanwhile the Ana-
lyzer controls if the stop condition is satisfied, and, in that
case, it signals the Proactive Collection to terminate the
full evidence collection. The sequence of events - including
their timestamps - collected during two consecutive times in
which a stop condition holds will be grouped into a snapshot
that is stored securely. Note that we assume that the stop
condition initially holds.
7. REACTIVE ACTIVITIES
Reactive Analysis is configured with the potential hy-
potheses of a crime which will be evaluated for all the events
snapshots preserved proactively. These are obtained by in-
stantiating the generic hypotheses depending on the con-
crete elements present in a crime scene. As shown in Table 2,
for our example, 27 hypotheses will be generated depending
on who can be in T225, who can log on M1, and who can own
the storage device that is mounted on M1. The potential hy-
;****************  Event Calculus Built-in Types  *****************
sort boolean
sort integer
reified sort predicate
sort time: integer
  ...
;***************************  Sorts  ******************************
sort employee
sort location
sort computer
  ...
;***************************  Events  *****************************
event Login(employee,computer)
event Logout(employee,computer)
event AccessToFile(employee,file,computer)
  ...
;**************************  Fluents  *****************************
fluent In(employee,location)
fluent Logged(employee,computer)
  ...
;********************  Initiates/Terminates  **********************
[employee,computer,time]
   Initiates(Login(employee,computer),Logged(employee,computer),time).
[employee,computer,time]
   Terminates(Logout(employee,computer),Logged(employee,computer),time).
  ...
;**********************  Monitored Events  ************************
event Sys_Login(employee,computer)
event Sys_Logout(employee,computer)
event Sys_Accessed(employee,file,computer)
  ...
;**************************  Constants  ***************************
file Doc
file E
computer M1
camera CCTV
reader NFC
employee Alice
  ...
;************************  Initial State  *************************
HoldsAt(HasPermission(Alice, M1),0).
HoldsAt(Monitor(CCTV,T225),0).
HoldsAt(AccessControl(NFC,T225),0).
!HoldsAt(HasPermission(Alice, M1),0).
[storage] !HoldsAt(Possess(Alice,storage), 0).
[storage,file,computer] !HoldsAt(Mounted(storage,file,computer),0).
  ...
;*********************  Collected Evidence  ***********************
  ...
**********************  Domain Assumptions  ***********************
  ...
*****  Suspicious Event / Potential Hypothesis Condition  *********
  ...
range time 0 X
range offset 1 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
Figure 5: A partial example of the Event Calculus
specification.
Table 2: Potential Hypotheses
Name In T225 Logged USB Owner
H1 Alice Alice Alice
H2 Alice Alice Bob
H3 Alice Alice Alice, Bob
H4 Alice Bob Alice
H5 Alice Bob Bob
H6 Alice Bob Alice, Bob
. . . . . . . . . . . .
H13 Bob Bob Alice
H14 Bob Bob Bob
H15 Bob Bob Alice, Bob
. . . . . . . . . . . .
H22 Alice, Bob Bob Alice
H23 Alice, Bob Bob Bob
H24 Alice, Bob Bob Alice, Bob
. . . . . . . . . . . .
H27 Alice, Bob Alice, Bob Alice, Bob
potheses are formalised in the Event Calculus, as shown in
Figure 5. In this case, the Monitored Events (part 4) will in-
clude one of the events snapshots collected proactively, while
the Conditions (part 6) will represent the specific condition
associated with a potential hypothesis of a crime. For exam-
ple, the condition associated with H4 is shown in Figure 6
and expresses that Alice is in room T225, Bob is logged on
M1 and copies the Doc on Alice’s storage device, which is
mounted on M1.
{storage,time,time1} HoldsAt(In(Alice,T225),time) & 
    HoldsAt(Logged(Bob,M1),time) &
    Happens(Copy(Doc,E,M1),time) & 
    HoldsAt(Mounted(storage,E,M1),time) & 
    HoldsAt(Possess(Alice,storage),time1) 
Figure 6: Formalisation of Hypothesis H4.
Once an investigation starts, the Analyzer retrieves all the
events snapshots that have been collected proactively and,
for each of them, it checks if the potential hypotheses are
satisfied. Note that some of the events could not be mon-
itored proactively, such as those that cannot be collected
automatically (e.g. CCTV_Access from CCTV). The Analyzer
indeed performs abductive reasoning to verify if potential
hypotheses can hold by speculating on the truth of these
events. In other words, these events represent the missing
evidence that must be collected to prove/refute the poten-
tial hypothesis. For our example, we assume that the events
snapshot on which the analysis is performed is the one rep-
resented in Figure 7. This indicates that Bob was logged on
M1 and copied the Doc on a USB pen that was mounted on
M1. For this events snapshot, the Analyzer discovers that
only some of the potential hypotheses can still hold (H4-H6,
H13-H15, and H22-H24).
Analysis results are sent to the Presentation activity, which
indicates the likelihood of each hypothesis depending on
the proportion of predicates that have been demonstrated
through the evidence collected (i.e., the predicates that have
not been abducted [14] and indeed are known). For our ex-
ample, the likelihood of hypotheses H4, H5, H13, and H14 is
60%, since the predicates specified on fluents Logged, Copy,
and Mounted are satisfied by using monitored events, while
the remaining predicates specified on fluents In and Pos-
sess leverage unkown events. The likelihood of H6, H15,
Happens(Sys_Login(Bob,M1),3).
!Happens(Sys_Login(Alice,M1),3).
!Happens(Sys_Logout(Bob,M1),3).
!Happens(Sys_Logout(Alice,M1),3).
[storage,file] !Happens(Sys_Mount(storage,file,M1),3).
[storage,file] !Happens(Sys_Unmount(storage,file,M1),3).
...
Happens(Sys_Mount(USB1,E,M1),6).
...
Happens(Sys_Copy(Doc,E,M1),8).
...
Happens(Sys_Unmount(USB1,E,M1),9).  
Figure 7: Events Snapshot Example.
H22, and H23 is 50%, as they include an additional pred-
icate that verifies if Alice and Bob own the USB pen that
was mounted on M1 (for H6 and H15) or are in room T225
(for H22 and H23). Finally the likelihood of H24 is about
42.86%, since it includes two additional predicates that state
that both Bob and Alice were in T225 and own the USB pen
that was mounted on M1. When an investigator selects a
hypothesis s/he is willing to explore, the Presentation iden-
tifies additional evidence to be collected from the output of
the Event Calculus analysis, by selecting those events that
cannot be monitored automatically, as shown in Figure 8.
In case an investigator selects one of the most likely hy-
potheses, such as H5, the Presentation suggests collecting
additional evidence (events Swipe_Card and CCTV_Access)
from the NFC and the CCTV that control room T225. Bob’s
corporate computer (M2) should also be inspected to ver-
ify whether he mounted the USB pen several times (event
HighMountCounts).
Happens(Swipe_Card(Bob, NFC),1).
Happens(CCTV_Access(Bob, T225, CCTV),1).
+In(Bob,T225)
Happens(Sys_Login(Bob,M1),3).
+Logged(Bob, M1)
Happens(HighMountCounts(USB1,M2),4).
Possess(Bob,USB1).
Happens(Sys_Mount(USB1,E,M1),6).
+Mounted(USB1,M1).
Happens(Sys_Copy(Doc,E,M1),8).
Happens(Sys_Unmount(USB1,E,M1),9).
-Mounted (USB1,M1)
Figure 8: Example of Additional Evidence
If an investigator collects events Happens(CCTV_Access(-
Alice,T225),1) and Happens(Swipe_Card(Alice,NFC),1),
it means that only Alice was in T225 when Bob logged
in. After the Reactive Analysis is re-performed, only 3 of
the remaining hypotheses can still hold (H4-H6) with 80%
of likelihood for H4 and H5 and about 67% of likelihood
for H6. In case an investigator decides to explore H4, the
Presentation suggests him/her to collect event HighMount-
Counts(USB1,M3) to justify that Alice owns the USB stor-
age. In case the investigator collects this evidence, only H4,
and H6 can still hold as they will be respectively 100%, and
83% likely. At this stage, the investigator can continue to
explore H6 that is still not completely satisfied.
Once a hypothesis is fully satisfied, the Presentation uses
the analysis results and the representation of the forensic
requirements to build a structured argument that explains
how collected evidence demonstrates the claim made by that
hypothesis. An argument is decomposed into grounds (sub-
argument : H4
A1 <desc> with HoldsAt(In(Alice,T225),8) & HoldsAt(Logged(Bob, M1),8) & HoldsAt(Mounted(USB1,E,M1),8) &
               Happens(Copy(Doc,E,M1),8) & HoldsAt(Possess(Alice,USB1),12){
   supported by
   G1 <desc> with HoldsAt(In(Alice,T225),8){
      supported by
      F1 <desc> with Happens(CCTV_Access(Alice,T225,CCTV),1)
      F2 <desc> with Happens(Swipe_Card(Alice,NFC),1)
      F3 <desc> with !HoldsAt(In(Alice,T225),0)
      F4 <desc> with HoldsAt(Monitor(CCTV,T225),0)
      F5 <desc> with HoldsAt(AccessControl(NFC,T225),0)
      F6 <desc> with [time] time <=8 -> !Happens(CCTV_Access(Alice,T225,CCTV),time) & !Happens(Swipe_Card(Alice,NFC),time)
      warranted by
      DK1 <desc> with [employee,location,camera,reader,time] (Happens(CCTV_Access(employee,location,camera),time) &
                      HoldsAt(Monitor(location,camera),time) & !HoldsAt(In(employee,location),time) & 
                      HoldsAt(HasBadge(employee,location),time) & Happens(SwipeCard(employee,reader),time) & 
                      HoldsAt(AccessControl(location,reader),time)) <-> Happens(Enter(employee,location),time)
      DK2 <desc> with [employee,location,time] Initiates(Enter(employee,location), In(employee,location),time)  
   }
   G2 <desc> with HoldsAt(Logged(Bob, M1),8)
   ...
   G3 <desc> with HoldsAt(Mounted(USB1,E,M1),8)
   ... }  
Figure 9: Structured Argument that Explains Hypothesis H4.
arguments) associated with a predicate defined on an event
or a fluent in the claim (hypothesis definition). A sketch of
the argument generated for H4 is shown in Figure 9. This is
decomposed into 5 grounds associated with each predicate of
the claim. The predicate included in the grounds is further
decomposed into lower-level grounds until only monitored
events are identified (facts representing collected evidence).
Facts and grounds in a sub-argument are related to their
parent argument through domain assumptions (warrants).
These explain how facts and grounds imply their parent ar-
gument. In Figure 9, ground G1 is associated with the pred-
icate defined on the fluent In. This ground is decomposed
into facts that represent the monitored events that demon-
strate that Alice entered in T225 at instant 1 (F1-F7) and
did not exit from the room till instant 8 (F8). The domain
assumptions that relate monitored events to state In are DK1
and DK2. DK1 relates state In to the event that initiates it
(Enter), while DK2 relates event Enter to facts F1-F8 that
trigger it.
8. EVALUATION
Our evaluation was conducted on a public digital forensic
case [15] where a confidential document of a startup com-
pany was posted in the technical support forum of a com-
petitor’s website. The document came from the computer
of the CFO (Jean). The data-set provides a copy of Jean’s
computer hard drive and a copy the document. The investi-
gation aims to understand how did the document get from
Jean’s computer to the competitor website. The data-set is
big enough to be realistic (∼1.46GB), but it is small enough
to allow performing an investigation on a desktop computer.
Our evaluation assessed the correctness and effectiveness
of our approach compared to traditional digital investiga-
tions aided by digital forensics tools. In particular, we ver-
ify if, under the assumptions that modeled hypotheses of a
crime are correct, our approach leads to the same - or even
more accurate - conclusions. Effectiveness is estimated in
terms of the amount of evidence an investigator has to anal-
yse that also affects the number of hypotheses to be evalu-
ated. We conducted the same investigation by using avail-
able digital forensics tools (Section 8.1), our approach with-
out proactive activities (Section 8.2), and our approach with
proactive activities (Section 8.3). The interested reader can
find a detailed description of the evaluation results in [32].
8.1 Traditional Digital Investigation
We acquired the image of the computer hard drive by
using the Sleuthkit & Autopsy tool [6] and we discovered
that the installed operating system is Windows XP Service
Pack 3. We also used PSTViewer [9] to analyse sent/received
emails and RegRipper [8] to analyse Windows Registry hives
and WinMD5 [46] to compute file hashes. By searching for
one of the strings contained in the confidential document
($1,009,000), the keyword search functionality of Autopsy
only gave one result (C:/.../m57biz.xls). This document
was created on 2008-06-16T16:13:51 and was last accessed
on 2008-07-20T01:28:03 by Jean. All the hypotheses we
formulated for this case are shown in Figure 10 and the
amount of evidence inspected (coming from search results)
and operations performed for each hypothesis is shown in
Figure 11.
1. m57biz.xls is sent via email from a computer user to an internal employee
2. m57biz.xls is sent via email from a computer user to an external recipient
    a. An internal employee was impersonating the external recipient
    b. The credential of the user were stolen
3. m57biz.xls is copied on a USB pen that is mounted by a computer user
    a. The credential of the user were stolen
4. A malware is installed from a blacklisted URL
Figure 10: Investigative hypotheses
In the first hypothesis we speculate that the document is
sent as an email attachment to an internal employee. Since
Outlook is the only email client in the list of the installed
programs (133), we analysed available Outlook data files
(administrator.pst and outlook.pst) containing Jean in-
box (222 received emails) and outbox (23 sent emails), and
the administrator inbox (1 received emails) and outbox (0
sent emails). We noticed that the confidential document was
sent as an email attachment by Jean as a response to another
email that she received from an external address (tuckgor-
ge@gmail.com). From this evidence we speculate that Jean
was the victim of a phishing attack and hypothesis 1 is not
viable.
Hence, the second hypothesis we formulated is that the
document is sent by Jean as an email attachment to an ex-
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Figure 11: # Results/Operations in a Traditional
Investigation.
ternal email address. We also formulated additional expla-
nations - sub-hypotheses. We thought that Jean simulated
to be the victim of a phishing attack, i.e. phishing emails
were coming from her laptop (2.a). However, from the evi-
dence available it was not possible to understand if Jean was
impersonating the sender of the phishing email. We also for-
mulated an additional explanation that Jean’s credentials
were stolen (2.b). To demonstrate this sub-hypothesis we
analysed the sam Windows registry hive to identify created
users (10 users), their last login time and the number of
failed logins. Among the users, only the Administrator (last
login on 2008-07-21T01:22:18 21 July 2008 01:22:18), Jean
(last login on 2008-07-20T00:00:41) and Devon (last login
on 2008-07-12T03:02:47) logged onto the laptop at least
once and no failed login attempt was made. Given the iden-
tified evidence, we do not have enough elements to demon-
strate sub-hypothesis 2.b.
The third hypothesis we formulated is that the confiden-
tial document was copied by a user on a storage device.
To demonstrate this hypothesis we inspected the system
Windows registry hive and we noticed that among the re-
movable media (3 results) a USB pen (S/N: 7&162a4319&0)
was mounted on E: on 2008-07-20T01:26:18. Although the
confidential document was last accessed near after this USB
storage was mounted, we cannot prove that the confidential
document was copied onto a USB storage.
The fourth hypothesis we formulated is that a malware
was downloaded form a blacklisted URL. However, only one
of the installed programs (QQBubbleArena) can be malicious,
since its signature does not belong to the NIST National
Software Reference Library (NSRL) [29], which contains the
files that are known to be good. From the web history
(∼1470 results) we did not identify any blacklisted URLs.
Indeed, we can only conclude that hypotheses 2 and 3 are
likely.
8.2 Reactive Digital Investigation
As a first step we modeled the crime scene associated with
the digital forensic scenario. This is very similar to the one
proposed for our previous case study. The general model
also includes additional entities to represent urls, programs,
more specific programs such as email clients (eClient) and
browsers, email accounts and files hashes. Programs can
also have a state as they can be Installed. We also included
in the general model a function that identifies the signature
of a file (MD5) and two untimed predicates that indicate if a
program is not a malware (InNSRL) and if a url is blacklisted
(IsBlack). The concrete model includes additional mon-
itored events to represent sent emails (Sent_Email), sent
emails with attachments (Sent_Attach), file searches (Fi-
le_Search) and web requests (Web_Request) for urls. As an
investigation starting point we considered the time instant
in which the confidential file was created. All programs that
were installed before that time were initially considered as
installed. At that point in time all the users were considered
not logged and all devices not mounted.
1. {user, file, email, email1,eClient,time} 
       HoldsAt(Logged(user,M1),time) & 
       Happens(Sent_Attach(email, email1, user, file,eClient, M1),time) & 
       MD5(file) = MD5(m57biz) & IsInternal(email1)
2. {user, file, email, email1,eClient,time} 
       HoldsAt(Logged(user,M1),time) & 
       Happens(Sent_Attach(email, email1, user, file,eClient, M1),time) & 
       MD5(file) = MD5(m57biz) & !IsInternal(email1)
       a. {email,time,time1} Happens(Logged(Jean,M1),time) & 
            Happens(Sent_Email(tuckgorge@gmail.com, email, Jean, Outlook, M1),time)
       b. {time} Happens(File_Search(m57, M1),time) | Happens(Wrong_Login(Jean,M1),time)
3. {user,storage,time} HoldsAt(Logged(user,M1)time) & 
       HoldsAt(Mounted(storage,E,M1),time) & Happens(Sys_Copy(m57biz,E,M1),time)
4. {url,browser,program,time} HoldsAt(Installed(program),time) & !InNSRL(program) & 
       Happens(Web_Request(url,browser,M1),time) & IsBlack(url)
Figure 12: Generic hypotheses of the evaluation sce-
nario.
The hypotheses of a crime were modelled as shown in Fig-
ure 12. Each hypothesis was customised depending on the
elements represented in bold. For example, hypotheses 1
and 2 are customised depending on the users (Jean, De-
von, and Administrator), on the email accounts found in
the disk image (e.g., jean@m57.biz, alison@m57.biz) (6 ac-
counts) and on the email clients (Outlook), for a total of 18
options. Hypothesis 3 is customised depending on the users
(3 options), while hypothesis 4 is customised depending on
the installed programs (133) and the browsers (Mozilla and
IE), for a total of 266 options.
All the evidence that is possible to gather from the disk
image was converted into an ordered sequence of events.
Sub-hypotheses were only evaluated for the concrete values
on which their parent hypotheses are satisfied. For exam-
ple, since hypothesis 2 is completely satisfied for user Jane,
email jean@m57biz.com, and email1 tuckgorge@gmail.com,
hypotheses 2.a and 2.b were only evaluated for these values.
However, hypotheses 2.a and 2.b are not satisfied. Hypoth-
esis 3 is 75% likely since only one of the monitored events is
abduced (event Sys_Copy). Indeed the results we obtained
are consistent with those obtained in a traditional digital
investigation and are slightly more accurate.
Forensic requirements make it possible to reduce the amount
of evidence used to evaluate each hypothesis, since only the
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Figure 13: Effectiveness of reactive activities.
events necessary to evaluate the predicates in the hypothesis
definition are considered. Figure 13 shows that the amount
of evidence considered to evaluate each hypothesis in the
reactive case was much smaller than the evidence collected
in a traditional digital investigation. The percentage val-
ues in the figure indicate the relative proportion of evidence
collected in the reactive case compared to the traditional
one.
8.3 Proactive & Reactive Digital Investigation
To evaluate proactive activities we simulated a sequence
of possible monitored events that could have been collected
proactively. We envisioned two possible situations. In the
first case, we crafted an event snapshot that complies with
the evidence collected from the disk image and shows that
Jean was pretending to be the victim of a phishing attack
(i.e. she was sending emails from her laptop as tuckgorge@gmail.com).
We assumed that this evidence was not available in the
disk image because it was concealed. The evaluation of the
crafted event snapshot shows that hypothesis 2.a is com-
pletely satisfied. In the second case, we crafted an event
snapshot demonstrating that Jean copied the confidential
document onto a USB pen. In this case, hypothesis 3 is
completely satisfied, since event Sys_Copy is considered in
the evaluation of the hypothesis and does not have to be
abducted. The aforementioned cases demonstrate the use-
fulness of proactive investigations when some evidence is
concealed by an offender (case 1) or is ephemeral and can-
not be retrieved from a disk image (case 2).
We estimated the effectiveness of proactive activities by
focusing on case 1. Together with the crafted event snap-
shot for hypothesis 2.a, we also included 3 event snapshots
that did not cause the satisfaction of any hypothesis. In
addition, we also assumed a new monitored event is trig-
gered hourly, with a uniform distribution. Note that we
considered that hypothesis 2.a is associated with a suspi-
cious event condition that a user is logged on the computer.
Indeed events Sys_Login and Sys_Logout will be collected to
check the start and stop condition and, additionally, events
Sent_Email and Sent_Attach will be gathered during the
full evidence collection. For this set of monitored events the
Proactive Collection only preserves the snapshots related to
the satisfaction of a suspicious events and avoids gather-
ing all the events necessary to satisfy a hypothesis. The
overhead of the Proactive Collection is only given by the
the events necessary to evaluate the start and stop condi-
tions. Proactive activities provide non negligible savings in
the amount of evidence analysed, as shown in Figure 14.
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Figure 14: Effectiveness of proactive activities.
The storage space required to preserve evidence collected
proactively for this case can be inferred by examining the
workloads of local systems within an organization. We ex-
pect that ∼10 GB per desktop system per year would be a
reasonable internal size [37].
8.4 Discussion
This section discusses the limitations of our approach and
proposes possible mitigation actions. Our approach makes
the assumption that the possible crimes that can be com-
mitted can be defined in advance. For this reason, it is
not viable to investigate those crimes that exploit undiscov-
ered vulnerabilities, or that can be performed by unforeseen
offenders, or that simply do not follow a predefined scheme
(e.g., intrusions, DDoS). However, in the future we are plan-
ning to investigate how learning techniques can be employed
to integrate the results of completed investigations or new
discovered vulnerabilities and attacks in the model of foren-
sic requirements. Furthermore, our approach does not aim
to completely replace traditional digital investigations, since
we recognise that in same cases the random guess by an ex-
perienced investigator can be very close to the reality. In-
stead, we aim to speedup repetitive analysis and collection
activities that are more suitable to be automated.
Modelling the hypotheses can be cumbersome and error-
prone and requires some automation. Our work is amenable
to leveraging existing model-based diagnosis approaches (e.g.,
[11, 24, 23]) that generate speculative hypotheses of a crime
by using, for example, planning techniques. In particular,
in the future we might encode the hypotheses generation
as a planning problem that starts from the initial state of
the crime scene and terminates when the crime condition is
achieved.
The Event Calculus-based analysis has an exponential com-
plexity. For this reason, the Event Calculus representing the
potential hypotheses must be built in a way that the prob-
lem dimension does not exceed ∼10000 variables [27], which
is the saturation point of SAT based problems. To achieve
this objective we employed some heuristics. A heuristic tries
to decompose a hypothesis into sub-hypotheses whose pred-
icates to be evaluated are disjunct and temporally indepen-
dent. A similar strategy was employed for hypotheses 2 and
2.a. Another heuristic reduces the length of the temporal
window by splitting a hypothesis into 2 or more hypothe-
ses evaluated over shorter and adjacent temporal windows.
This strategy can be suitable for situations in which a se-
quence of monitored events leads the crime scene again to
the condition in which a hypothesis was initially evaluated.
9. RELATEDWORK
We now review related work on automating evidence col-
lection, analysis, and presentation.
9.1 Evidence Collection
Existing tools that perform evidence collection are aimed
to support computer forensics [20, 4, 38, 6], data recovery [1]
and live data collection [25, 10]. However, these approaches
do not apply proactive evidence collection and analysis dur-
ing the normal functioning of a system. Live acquisition
of digital evidence is only performed after an incident hap-
pened and, therefore, some evidence or the traces concealed
by an offender can be missed. Shield et al. [37] have recently
proposed the idea to perform continuous proactive evidence
collection. However, they do not suggest any possible way to
select the evidence to be collected depending on the crimes
that can take place in a certain environment. Compared
to previous work, our approach does not only preserve im-
portant evidence that could be lost, but it also allows using
collected evidence to trigger and guide an investigation, by
indicating hypotheses to examine and additional evidence to
collect.
9.2 Evidence Analysis
Formal techniques have been mainly used to analyse digi-
tal evidence. Petri Nets were used to model occurred events
and identify the root causes that allowed an incident to oc-
cur [40]. Gladyshev and Patel [18] formalise evidence as a
series of witness stories that restrict the possible computa-
tion of a finite state machine that describes the behaviour
of the system. All possible scenarios of incident are ob-
tained by backtracing transitions from the initial state of
the system. Other work is specialised on identifying attack-
ers’ traces (e.g., evidence and timestamps improperly ma-
nipulated by an attacker), from violations of invariant rela-
tionships between digital objects [39] or by applying model
checking techniques on a set of events expressed in a multi-
sorted algebra [3].
Model-based reasoning techniques [11, 24, 23, 35] have
been used extensively to deduce investigative hypotheses.
Plan recognition techniques have been applied to generate
possible attacks sequences, simulate them on the victim model,
and perform pattern matching recognition between their
side-effects and log files entries. Abductive reasoning [24]
was used to explain a crime scenario from a set of events
and domain assumptions and to suggest additional evidence
to be collected. Experts’ assessments of the probability of
the hypotheses was also used to rank the evidence collec-
tion strategies to be performed during an investigation [23].
However, the aforementioned approaches are reactive and
available evidence might not always be enough to recon-
struct a crime. For this reason, Rekhis et al. [35] propose
a language to create hypothetical attacks scenarios in case
no attack can be explained. Similarly to model-based ap-
proaches, our work allows reasoning on speculative hypothe-
ses that are implicitly inferred from collected evidence [11,
24, 23] or explicitly modeled [35]. However, our approach is
not focused on proposing a new technique for evidence anal-
ysis. Our objective, instead is to use forensic requirements
to engineer systems able to preserve important evidence that
can be fundamental to solve a case. When an investigation
starts the amount of evidence analysed is highly reduced
compared to the case when all the evidence is collected. De-
spite the idea of integrating proactive collection and analysis
within a digital investigation has been already proposed, ex-
isting work [19, 2] do not offer a pathway to implementation
and do not specify how proactive and reactive activities can
be coordinated.
9.3 Presentation
Our work uses structured arguments to demonstrate how
collected evidence can demonstrate a set of hypotheses to
be defended in court. Another work [12] proposes to achieve
the same objective by testing and replaying an attack in an
isolated environment that is similar to the real one. When
the test is finished, the analyst can relate the effects of the
attack in the virtual environment to the digital evidence in
the digital crime scene. If the identified effects do not sup-
port the hypotheses, the hypotheses should be reformulated,
and the necessary test events should be replayed. The main
drawback of this approach is that it requires reproducing an
attack in a realistic environment to understand how it took
place. Instead, we explicitly model the crime scene and the
hypotheses of a crime to build structured arguments that
formally demonstrate a hypothesis and explain how a crime
took place.
10. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
This paper has proposed an approach to engineer forensic-
ready sofware systems. We proposed an adaptive process to
systematically perform the activities to be conducted be-
fore and during a digital forensic investigation. The process
performs proactive activities to preserve important evidence
and suggests immediate investigative directions. Second,
we introduced the notion of forensics requirements to sys-
tematically configure the activities of the proposed digital
forensics process depending on a specific crime scene and
on the speculative hypotheses of a crime. Finally, we ex-
plained how structured arguments can be used to present
the findings of an investigation. Our results suggest that
our approach reduces significantly the evidence that needs
to be collected and the hypotheses that need to be analysed
during an investigation. In the future we are planning to ap-
ply our approach in pervasive and distributed environments,
such as cloud platforms, where a large amount of evidence
is ephemeral. We are also investigating new techniques to
elicit forensics requirements from existing regulations.
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